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PROPERTY
I.

COVENANTS

Private Controls Of Land Use - Restrictive Covenants in Planned
Subdivisions
Land-use covenants in a planned subdivision are designed to provide
for a general plan or scheme of development.' In subdivisions, restrictive
covenants also perform the function of a sales tool by encouraging
potential buyers to make the decision to purchase based upon the existence
of certain amenities .2 The continued existence of these amenities are
protected by restrictive covenants that run with the land.' Three cases
during the survey period addressed the developer's responsibilities in
enforcing, and modifying restrictive covenants that run with the
creating,
4
land.
In Appel v. Presley Cos.,' Appel purchased land in the Vista Del
Sandia subdivision in Albuquerque in 1982.6 The subdivision was developed by the Presley Companies ("Presley"). 7 Presley created a set of
restrictive covenants for the subdivision that regulated the land use,
building type, quality, and size of the residential single-family dwelling
that were to be built within the subdivision. 8 These restrictive covenants
were used as a sales tool to encourage prospective buyers to purchase
property within the subdivision. 9 Appel relied upon these restrictive covenants when making a decision to purchase property within the subdivision. o
In 1984, the subdivision's three member Architectural Control Committee executed an amendment to the restrictive covenants." The committee members were all officers or employees of Presley.' 2 This amendment
deleted nine lots from the effect of the covenants." This allowed Presley
to subdivide these lots into smaller lots and sell them for the purpose
A.

1. Appel v. Presley Cos., I11 N.M. 464, 466, 806 P.2d 1054, 1056 (1991).
2. Knight v. City of Albuquerque, 110 N.M. 265, 266, 794 P.2d 739, 740 (Ct. App. 1990).
3. Id.
4. See Appel v. Presley Cos., III N.M. 464, 806 P.2d 1054; Knight v. City of Albuquerque,
110 N.M. 265, 794 P.2d 739; Wilcox v. Timberon Protective Servs., III N.M. 478, 806 P.2d 1068
(Ct. App. 1991).
5. 111 N.M. 464, 806 P.2d 1054 (1991).
6. Id. at 465, 806 P.2d at 1055.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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of constructing townhouses.14 This type of amendment was expressly
authorized by provisions contained within the restrictive covenants."
Appel filed suit alleging that Presley violated the restrictive covenants.' 6
He sought an injunction to prevent Presley from further subdividing the
lots that had been removed from the protection of the restrictive covenants.' 7 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Presley.,8
It determined that the restrictive covenants expressly authorized the Architectural Control Committee to modify the covenants.' 9 Appel appealed
the trial court's decision. 20 The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed and
2
remanded. '
The supreme court agreed that the language of the covenants permitted
the Architectural Control Committee to amend the covenants .22 The court,
however, also noted "the inherent inconsistency between an elaborate set
of restrictive covenants, designed to provide for a general scheme or plan
of development, and a clause reserving in the grantor the power to change
'
or abandon any part of it. '23
Drawing on the law of other jurisdictions, the court reconciled this
inconsistency by reading into the restrictive clause a requirement of
reasonableness. 24 The court stated that "[a] determination of whether the
exceptions were reasonably exercised or whether they essentially destroyed
the covenants requires resolution of a factual matter. '25 The supreme
court instructed the trial court that in the event the exceptions were
applied in an unreasonable manner, thus breaching the covenants, the
trial court was to apply the doctrine of relative hardships 26 to determine
whether to grant injunctive relief in favor of Appel. 27 The court then
remanded the case for further proceedings. 21
Appel has changed New Mexico law on the issue of restrictive covenants
in subdivisions to include the requirement that enforcement of such

14. Id.
15. Id. at 466, 806 P.2d at 1056.
16. Id.at 465, 806 P.2d at 1055.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.at 466, 806 P.2d at 1056.
20. Id.at 465, 806 P.2d at 1055.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 466, 806 P.2d at 1056.
23. Id. (citing Flamingo Ranch Estates, Inc. v. Sunshine Ranches Homeowners, Inc., 303 So.
2d 665 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974)).
24. Id. (citing Flamingo Ranch Estates, Inc., 303 So. 2d 665); see also Moore v. Megginson,
416 So. 2d 993 (Ala. 1982).
25. Appel, Ill N.M. at 466, 806 P.2d at 1056.
26. Id. at 467, 806 P.2d at 1057. The doctrine of relative hardships requires a balancing of
hardships and equities. The factors which the trial court should consider include:
(1) [T]he character of the interest to be protected, (2) the relative adequacy to the
plaintiff of injunction in comparison with other remedies, (3) the delay, if any, in
bringing suit, (4) the misconduct of the plaintiff if any, (5) tl'! interest of third
persons, (6) the practicability of granting and enforcing the order or judgment,
and (7) the relative hardship likely to result to the defendant if an injunction is
granted and to the plaintiff if it is denied.
27. Id.. at 466, 806 P.2d at 1056.
28. Id.at 467, 806 P.2d at 1057.
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covenants be equitable. Prior to Appel, the court examined only the
language of such covenants, and enforced that language unless ambiguous.
29
In Knight v. City of Albuquerque, the New Mexico Court of Appeals
focused on a developer's ability to make representations in an attempt
to encourage the purchase of property within the subdivision and later
renege on those representations. The original developers of Paradise Hills
filed a plat showing that a certain amount of land within the subdivision
would be used as a golf course.30 The plat showing the golf course was
used as a selling tool.3" When Knight made the decision to purchase land
within the subdivision, he relied on the developer's representation that
the land designated as a golf course would not be developed for other
uses.3 2 The developer later attempted to develop the land that had been
33
set aside for the golf course. Knight responded by filing suit. It was
undisputed that the developer had reserved "the right to build hotels,
cottages, or other facilities on any tract shown on the Paradise Hills
Country Club Estates plat without the permission of the owners of any
lot located within the subdivision." This reservation was contained within
that was incorthe recorded conditions and restrictions on development
35
deeds.
warranty
purchaser's
the
within
porated
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Knight and
issued a declaratory judgment delineating the boundaries of the golf
course. 36 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the use of the plat
showing the existence of the golf course used as a selling tool created
a private right, or implied covenant, in favor of the purchasers of land
within the subdivision that was superior to the developer's attempt to
37
reserve the power to modify the plat. The court stated that "a developer
will not be allowed to induce purchasers to buy property by purporting
to include open space such as parks or golf courses in a subdivision
space areas. "38
plat, only to subsequently change the uses of those open
Prior to Knight, New Mexico law maintained that a developer may
not induce purchasers to buy property by purporting to include such
amenities as golf courses in the subdivision plat and later modify the
39
use of these open spaces. Knight represents an extension of this rule
to those cases where the developer has expressly retained the right to
build structures anywhere on the plat without the approval of the landowners.

29. 110 N.M. 265, 794 P.2d 739 (Ct. App. 1990).
30. Id. at 266, 794 P.2d at 740.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
golf
36. Id. at 266, 794 P.2d at 740. The court limited the use of that property to use as a
purpose.
space
open
similar
course, park, or other
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Ute Park Summer Homes Ass'n v. Maxwell Land Grant Co., 77 N.M. 730, 427
P.2d 249 (1967); Cree Meadows, Inc. v. Palmer, 68 N.M. 479, 362 P.2d 1007 (1961).
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In Wilcox v. Timberon Protective Association,40 the New Mexico Court

of Appeals addressed two questions regarding restrictive covenants. The

court first addressed whether a restrictive covenant prohibiting the clas-

sification of mobile homes as residences was ambiguous. Second, the
court addressed whether the trial court abused its discretion in upholding
affirmative defenses to the enforcement of the covenant. 4'

Wilcox purchased a lot in Timberon, a large, planned resort community

located in Otero County and developed by North American Land Development, Inc. 42 The development consisted of thirty-three separately
developed subdivisions that contain lots owned by several thousand prop-

erty owners. 43 The developer prepared and recorded separate sets of
restrictive covenants applicable to each subdivision as it was developed.4

The developer initially enforced the restrictive covenants, including architectural control within the developments. 45 Timberon Property Association ("TPA") took over this responsibility in 1983.4 TPA was responsible

for the enforcement of restrictive covenants within Timberon, including

the approval or disapproval of building plans from 1983 until the time
47

of trial.
The restrictive covenants for the subdivision in which Wilcox's lot was
located contained a provision that limited the use of various structures

as permanent residences, including mobile homes." Wilcox purchased his
land relying on the restrictive covenants and the representations of sales
49

people. He was assured that mobile homes could not be used as permanent residences in this subdivision.50 Further, Wilcox saw no mobile
homes being used as residences within the subdivision during his inspection
5
of it. 1

Wilcox was not informed of a long-standing policy of TPA that allowed
the placing of mobile homes on lots within the subdivision if the mobile
homes were permanently converted to non-moveable structures and if

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

111 N.M. 478, 806 P.2d 1068 (Ct. App. 1991).
Id. at 481, 806 P.2d at 1071.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 482, 806 P.2d at 1072.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The full text of the provision follows:
No trailer, mobile home, basement, tent, shack, garage, barn or other outbuilding
shall at any time be used as a residence, nor shall any residence of a temporary
character be erected or permitted to remain. However, contractors may use a
temporary building during the course of construction. And a travel trailer may be
used as a temporary residence for a period of up to thirty (30) days if it is not
connected to a water line and septic tank and if it is so connected, then the travel
trailer may be used for a period of up to one-hundred eighty (180) days out of
any one year period. The travel trailer must be removed from the lot during the
remaining balance of each year.
49. Id. at 483, 806 P.2d at 1073.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 482, 806 P.2d at 1072.
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certain cosmetic changes were made.12 At the time Wilson made his
purchase, three mobile homes were already located within the subdivision,
and more were added over time."
Wilcox filed suit alleging breach of the restrictive covenants and seeking
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief after making repeated complaints to the Architectural Control Committee and the Board of Directors
of TPA.54 The trial court entered judgment in favor of the defendants
on the basis that the restrictive covenants were ambiguous." The trial
court reasoned that it was unclear whether only temporary structures
were intended to be prohibited or whether the restriction was one on
mobile homes per se.56 Alternatively, the trial court held that even if the
covenants had been intended to prohibit all mobile homes, conditionss7
had so changed that the restrictive covenants were no longer enforceable.
test
Further, the court concluded that under a "balancing of hardships"
59
Wilcox was limited to an action for damages.18 Wilcox appealed.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals held in favor of Wilson, finding
that the phrase "mobile home" as used in the restrictive covenants was
unambiguous.6 The court cited an Illinois case that held the phrase
"mobile home" is unambiguous and refers to a method of construction
6
rather than the mobility of the completed structure. ' The court buttressed
this holding by noting that the restrictive covenant in question also
prohibited the use of other types of construction for living purposes,
62
i.e., trailers, basements, garages, barns and other outbuildings.
The court then went on to address defendant's equitable defenses. In
determining whether to grant the request for injunctive relief, the court
considered a number of factors and balanced any existing equities and
hardships. 63
The court found that the interest protected by the covenant in question
unit. 64
was the architectural and aesthetic integrity of the subdivision
lots
Prior to the filing of the suit, only approximately ten of the 412
65 This
homes.
mobile
of
had been used for the permanent placement
number of mobile homes was insufficient to allow the court to find that

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.at 483, 806 P.2d at 1073.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.at 481, 806 P.2d at 1071.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 484, 806 P.2d at 1074 (citing Brownfield Subdivision, Inc. v. McKee, 19 II. App.
3d 374, 311 N.E.2d 174 (1974)).
62. Id. at 485, 806 P.2d at 1075.

63. Id. at 486, 806 P.2d at 1076. For a list a factors to be considered when balancing existing
equities and hardships see supra note 26 and accompanying text.
64. Wilcox, 111 N.M. at 486, 806 P.2d at 1076.
65. Id.
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conditions had changed to such an extent that the covenant could no
longer protect the interest for which it was created. 6
In examining the relative adequacy of an injunction, the court found
that legal remedies, in this case damages, are always inadequate because
damages due to loss of quiet enjoyment of land are incalculable. 67 The
court stated "[w]here one enters into a restrictive covenant and then
breaches it, he will be enjoined, irrespective of the amount of damage
caused by his breach, and even if there appears to be no particular

damage.

"68

The court held that plaintiff had not delayed in filing suit, that plaintiff
had exhibited no misconduct, and that defendants, as third parties, had
no interest that outweighed the effect of the restrictive covenants that
ran with the land. 69 In addition, the court held that it would be practical
to enforce the covenant and that the relative hardship to the defendants,
if any, was not so substantial so as to outweigh plaintiff's right to
injunctive relief. 70
Wilcox has added only slightly to New Mexico law by holding that
the term "mobile home," when used in a restrictive covenant, refers to
the method of construction of the structure, and not whether the structure
is capable of being moved.
B.

Covenants of Title
New Mexico has long recognized common law warranty covenants of
title. Traditionally, these covenants have included covenants of seisin,
right to convey, freedom from encumbrances, warranty, quiet enjoyment,
and further assurances.7 ' These common law warranties of title are now
72
codified.
Issues pertaining to warranty covenants of title have only been addressed
once during the survey period. In Bloom v. Hendricks73 the New Mexico
Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the grantor of a general

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 487, 806 P.2d at 1077.
Id. at 487-88, 806 P.2d at 1077-78.
Id. at 489, 806 P.2d at 1079.
71. 6A R. PowELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 900[l] (1992).
72. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-1-37 (Repl. Pamp. 1991). This section reads:
In a conveyance of real estate the words, 'warranty covenants' shall have the full
force, meaning and effect of the following words: 'the grantor for himself, his
heirs, executors, administrators and successors, covenants with the grantee, his heirs,
successors and assigns, that he is lawfully seized in fee simple of the granted
premises; that they are free from all former and other grants, bargains, sales, taxes,
assessments and encumbrances of what kind and nature soever; that he has good
right to sell and convey the same; and that he will, and his heirs, executors,
administrators and successors shall warrant and defend the same to the grantee
and his heirs, successors and assigns forever against the lawful claims and demands
of all persons.
73. 111 N.M. 250, 804 P.2d 1069 (1991).
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warranty deed is responsible for the attorney's fees expended by the
4
grantee in a successful defense of the title conveyed..
He
Bloom purchased a forty-acre tract in Otero County in 1981."
76 At the
grantor.
the
Hendricks,
from
deed
warranty
general
a
obtained
time of purchase, Bloom expressed concern that a portion of the land
was being used by a third party, the Lanes.7 He was assured by the
7
grantor that the "use was permissive and would cease upon request.1
After completing the purchase, "Bloom wrote to the Lanes revoking
' 79 The Lanes claimed title to a
permission for their use of the tract.
portion of the land under several theories.80 The parties were unable to
resolve the dispute and the Lanes sued, claiming title "by virtue of a
boundary by acquiescence, and alternatively, claiming a prescriptive easement."s'
title to a
The trial court found in favor of the Lanes and quieted
82
Blooms
The
1.474 acre portion of the property in favor of the Lanes.
appealed
were evicted from that portion of the property." The decision was
to the New Mexico Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court's
decision. 84 The court of appeals quieted title to the tract in the Blooms
with the exception of a prescriptive easement across 0.302 acres used as
83
a parking area by the Lanes. The Blooms then filed suit against the
grantor, Hendricks, seeking to recover the8 6 costs of defending the title
to the property, including attorney's fees. The district court held for
Hendricks and Bloom appealed.
The New Mexico Supreme Court first declined to extend the holding
of Tabet Lumber Co. v. Golighty7 to possession by acquiescence. The
court held that a suit "under the doctrine of acquiescence implicates .. .
covenants" contained within a general warranty deed "regardless of any
open and obvious encroachment.' '88 The court further stated that unlike
a prescriptive easement, the claim of possession by acquiescence infringes
on the title itself.8 9 In arriving at this conclusion, the court reasoned that
an open and obvious prescriptive easement is apparent to the purchaser
upon inspection of the real estate and it is presumed that any injury to
the purchaser was contemplated by the purchaser and seller and taken

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
do not
88.
89.

Id.
Id. at 252, 804 P.2d at 1071.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 253, 804 P.2d at 1072.
Id.
Id. at 251, 804 P.2d at 1070.
80 N.M. 442, 457 P.2d 374 (1969). Tabet held that open and obvious prescriptive easements
breach warranty deed covenants against encumbrances. Id. at 443, 457 P.2d at 375.
Bloom, Ill N.M. at 254, 804 P.2d at 1073.
Id.
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into consideration in the price of the property.9 0 It is not necessarily
apparent to a prospective purchaser, however, that a landowner has
assented to a boundary consistent with adverse use. 9'
The court then addressed the question of when grantee may recover
the costs of the defense of the title from adverse claims from the grantor. 92
The court held that the purchaser is allowed to recover the costs of
defending the title when the seller bears no responsibility for the substance
of the adverse claim and had no knowledge of the potential adverse
claim when he conveyed the property. The purchaser must, however,
first demand that the grantor appear and defend the title and the purchaser's own defense of the title must be unsuccessful. 9 If the seller
bears some responsibility for the substance of the adverse claim or had
knowledge of the potential claim when he conveyed and warrantied the
property, the purchaser can recover the costs of defending the title,
including attorney's fees, except when the purchaser made no demand
on the seller to appear and defend the title and the purchaser's own
defense of the title was unsuccessful.94
The question of whether a grantee, based upon a warranty covenant,
can recover the cost of defending the title to the property has not
previously been addressed in New Mexico. Thus, Bloom has extended
New Mexico law in this area.
II. PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS
New Mexico courts addressed issues regarding prescriptive easements
only once during the survey period. Perscriptive easements are acquired
by land use which is "open, uninterrupted, peaceable, notorious, adverse,
continuous, and under a claim of right for a period of ten years or
longer." 95 In Maloney v. Wreyford,9 6 the New Mexico Court of Appeals
addressed the question of whether the trial court had sufficient evidence
to find that a prescriptive easement forty-three feet wide and 400 feet
long existed over Wreyford's property in favor of Maloney. 97
Wreyford owned a tract of land adjacent to land owned by Maloney. 9
The two tracts were surveyed beginning at different corner posts, resulting
in an overlap of forty-three feet, caused by surveying error.9 Maloney
used a portion of that land for an access road to his property.' 00 He
had done so for a period in excess of ten years.'0 ' The road had a gate

90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 255-56, 804 P.2d at 1074-75.
94. Id.
95. Herbertson v. lliff,
108 N.M. 552, 775 P.2d 754 (Ct. App. 1989).
96. 111 N.M. 221, 804 P.2d 412 (Ct. App. 1990).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 223, 804 P.2d at 414.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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across its entrance and Maloney locked the gate and exercised control
02
over it for the full ten-year period' The trial court found that Maloney
had a prescriptive easement forty-three feet wide by 400 feet long across
the servient estate and awarded Maloney 4 compensatory damages of
$3,007.07 and costs.'0 3 Wreyford appealed.10
The New Mexico Court of Appeals declined to address the question
05
of damages because the issue was not raised in the docketing statement.
The court did, however, address the question of whether the finding that
a prescriptive easement existed was supported by the evidence.'10 The
Court of Appeals held that the easement did exist, but that there was
insufficient evidence to find that it occupied the entire forty-three foot
7
width of the disputed property.'0
The court first examined whether the plaintiff had acquired the easement
by use that was "open, uninterrupted, peaceable, notorious, under a
claim of right, and continuous for a period 8of ten years with the knowledge
'
The court found that all of
or imputed knowledge of the owner."'
was insufficient evidence
there
that
except
these requirements were met,
of the roadway for
width
foot
fifty
full
the
to show that Maloney used
9 Rather the evidence only supported the
time10
the prescribed period of
0
use of a sixteen foot width of the property, the width of the gate."
The court further held that a prescriptive easement, used for the prescribed
ten year period for general purposes for the access to a parcel of land,
could continue to be used once the use was changed to access to a home
built upon that parcel of land."' The court stated that general use
2
established a general right."1 Construction of the house did not constitute
a material change in the nature or character of the use."'
COMMERCIAL LEASES
New Mexico courts addressed commercial leases and the relationship
the survey period." 4 In
between lessee and lessor three times during
5
Mesilla Valley Mall v. Crown Industries," the New Mexico Supreme
Court addressed the question of whether a lessor could recover unpaid
rent from a tenant who had vacated the premises when the lessor had
III.

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.at 225, 804 P.2d at 416.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.at 224, 804 P.2d at 415.
109. Id.at 225, 804 P.2d at 416.
110. Id.
Ill. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
Hahn
114. Mesilla Valley Mall v. Crown Indus., I11 N.M. 663, 808 P.2d 633 (1991); Goradia v.
806
383,
N.M.
Ill
Garley,
v.
Dep't
Transp.
&
Highway
(1991);
Co., Ill N.M. 779, 810 P.2d 798
P.2d 32 (1991).
115. 111 N.M. 663, 808 P.2d 633 (1991).
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allowed a local museum to occupy the leased premises rent-free after the
16
tenant had vacated.
Crown Industries ("Crown") occupied retail space at the Mesilla Valley
Mall under a long term lease with the Mesilla Valley Mall Company
("Mesilla"). 17 Crown attempted to renegotiate the lease terms, but Mesilla
refused to make adjustments." 8 Crown informed Mesilla that it would
vacate the premises, and later did so." 9 The unpaid rent under the terms
of the lease was $35,056.58 at the time Crown vacated the premises.'10
Mesilla repossessed the premises and allowed the Las Cruces Museum
of Natural History to occupy the space rent-free.' 2 ' Mesilla described the
museum as "a tenant at sufferance.' ' 22 The museum was aware that it
might have to vacate the premises with as little as one day notice. 23
Mesilla filed suit against Crown to collect all amounts due under the
terms of the lease. 24 At trial, Crown raised the affirmative defense of
surrender and acceptance. 25 The trial court found that "nothing in the
lease agreement allowed the Mall to re-enter the property for any other
purpose than to relet for the benefit of the tenant, and, in particular
to re-lease the property for no rent and for its own benefit."'2 Mesilla
1 27
appealed.
The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the lower court ruling stating
that in the absence of legal justification, a tenant who abandons property
is liable for rent for the remainder of the lease term. 28 The lessor is
under no obligation to relet the premises to mitigate the tenant's liability
under the terms of the lease. 29 The lessor, however, may elect to take
possession of the leased property and relet it for the benefit of the
lessee. 301 In the alternative, the lessor may accept the tenant's offer of
surrender of the leasehold, thereby terminating the lease.'' If the lessor
chooses this option, the lessee is liable only for rent accrued prior to
the acceptance. 3 2 The court found that Mesilla's actions had the effect
of accepting Crown's offer of surrender, thus relieving Crown of any
further obligation under the terms of the lease. 3 The Mall Company's
re-entry of the leased premises was for its own purposes, primarily the
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at

664, 808 P.2d at 634.

665, 808 P.2d at 635.

664, 808 P.2d at 634.
665, 808 P.2d at 635.

666, 808 P.2d at 636.
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improvement of community relations by placing a branch of the local
3 4 This action by the lessor was
Natural History Museum in the mall.
35
inconsistent with the continuing rights of the tenant under the lease.
36
law.
of
matter
a
Therefore, the doctrine of surrender applied as
In Goradia v. Hahn Co., the New Mexico Supreme Court addressed
the question of whether a shopping center tenant was discriminated against
by the management of the shopping center when the manager refused
to renew his lease. Goradia operated a small shop within a shopping
center operated by the Hahn Company ("Hahn") for a period of eight
years. 3 8 At the end of the lease period, Hahn refused to renew Goradia's
lease. 3 9 Hahn did offer to allow Goradia to lease another space on the
Goradia4
periphery of the shopping center, but only on the condition that
that space to move. 0
in
tenant
the
induce
to
fee
finder's
$80,000
an
pay
Goradia rejected the offer and filed suit against Hahn alleging 4'that Hahn
nationality.'
refused to renew the lease because of Goradia's
At trial, Hahn defended its action as a42 legitimate business decision
based on its efforts to improve tenant mix. As a reason for its decision
not to renew Goradia's lease, Hahn stated that Goradia's methods of
merchandising set up a "garage sale" atmosphere that was inappropriate
143
After Goradia vacated the premises, Hahn
for the shopping center.
rented the area to a flower shop, which had lower sales than Goradia's
store, thus lowering Hahn's income from the space.'" Hahn argued,
however, that the flower shop would draw more45 people to the shopping
center, thus, in total, increasing Hahn's income. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of Hahn and Goradia appealed.'"
The supreme court affirmed the holding of the trial court stating "[t]here
is nothing in the record to suggest that [Goradia's] lease would have
Indian
been renewed if, for example, an Irish person had been selling
47 Any disclothing in Goradia's shop in a 'garage sale' atmosphere."'
crimination against Goradia was for valid business reasons and not for
invalid racial or ethnic reasons.1
49
In Highway & TransportationDepartment v. Garley, the New Mexico
Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a commercial lessee

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id.
Id.
111 N.M. 779, 810 P.2d 798 (1991).
Id. at 779, 810 P.2d at 798.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 780, 810 P.2d at 799.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 781, 810 P.2d at 800.
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could avoid the effect of a condemnation clause of a lease on the grounds
of misrepresentation, mutual mistake, or unconscionability.' 50
In 1977, Garley leased a piece of property, on which a bar and lounge
was located, to Jerry Olguin.'1' After a substantial period of time, during
which the lease was renewed twice without material change to its terms,
the State Highway Department brought a condemnation proceeding, seeking to condemn the entire property, due to the reconstruction of the
intersection of State Highways 47 and 49.152 Only the lessor, Garley, was
named as a defendant to the action.'" The lessee "intervened and asserted
an interest in the tract by virtue of his lease.' ' 5 4 On a motion for
summary judgment, the trial court found for the lessor, and the lessee
appealed.'
The standard long-form lease executed by the parties contained a
provision that stated that the lease would terminate if the property was
condemned. 56 At the time the lease was executed, the parties believed
that some portion of the property would eventually be condemned due
to the planned reconstruction of the intersection of State Highways 47
and 49, and that this condemnation would probably result in the destruction of the lounge. 57 The lessee, however, later swore by affidavit
that both he and the lessor believed that the State Highway Department
would only condemn that portion of the property that contained the
lounge.'5 He further alleged that the lessor had stated that the proceeds
from the condemnation would be used to rebuild the lounge on the
remaining portion of the property. 59
On appeal, the lessee contended that the lease should not be enforced
because the parties were mutually mistaken in their belief that the condemnation would be partial instead of total. t6° He alternatively claimed
that the lease should be reformed to delete the condemnation clause due
to the parties' mutual mistake; that the lessor's statements to him about
his intention to rebuild the lounge on the property remaining after a
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partial condemnation were misrepresentations, which entitled the lessee
to avoid or reform the condemnation clause."' Finally, the lessee argued
that the condemnation clause should not be enforced because it was
unconscionable."62
In rejecting the lessee's contention that the parties were mutually
mistaken as to the extent of the condemnation, the New Mexico Supreme
Court adopted section 152 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts that
states that a contract is voidable by the adversely affected party when
the parties have made a mutual mistake as to a basic assumption on
which the contract was based." 63 The court found that the lessee's sworn
statements in his affidavit were sufficient to raise the issue of mutual
mistake. 64 The court held, however, that because the lessee sought only
partial avoidance of the lease, the doctrine of mutual mistake was inapplicable. Again citing the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the court
stated that a party to a contract "cannot disaffirm part of the contract
that is particularly disadvantageous to himself while affirming a more
advantageous part, and an attempt to do so is ineffective as a disaffirmance.'"6
The court stated several additional reasons why the lessee could not
use the doctrine of mutual mistake as grounds to avoid the condemnation
clause. First, the mistake did not relate to a fact that was presently
existing at the time the original lease or the subsequent renewals were
executed."' While both parties to the lease may have believed that only
some portion of the property would be condemned, there was no evidence
that the State Highway Department had any then existing intention to
condemn the entire parcel. 167 The doctrine of mutual mistake applies only
to facts that exist at the time of execution of the contract."' As the
Highway Department did not plan to condemn the entire property at the
time the lease was executed, the doctrine of mutual mistake was not
applicable.
Additionally, the doctrine of mutual mistake was not applicable because
the doctrine may not be used by a party who has accepted the risk of

161. Id.

162. Id.
163. Id. at 386, 806 P.2d at 35. The pertinent portion of Section 152 reads:

Where a mistake of both parties at the time a contract was made as to a basic
assumption on which the contract was made has a material effect on the agreed
exchange of performances, the contract is voidable by the adversely affected party
unless he bears the risk of mistake.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152 (1979).
164. Garley, I II N.M. at 386, 806 P.2d at 35.
165. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 383 comment a (1979)).

166. Id.
167. Id.
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 151 comment a (1979).
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the mistake.' 6 9 Section 154 of the Restatement, states that a party bears
the risk of a mistake when
(a) the risk is allocated to him by agreement of the parties, or
(b) he is aware, at the time the contract is made, that he has only
limited knowledge with respect to the facts to which the mistake
relates but treats his limited knowledge as sufficient, or
(c) the risk is allocated to him by the court on the ground that it
is reasonable in the circumstances to do so.
The court found that all three sub-rules apply in this case. 70 The lease
specifically allocated the risk of partial condemnation to the lessee,
therefore, subsection (a) is applicable.' 7 ' Further, the context of the parties'
negotiations and dealings made subsections (b) and (c) applicable. 72
As an alternative, the lessee sought the equitable remedy of reformation. 73 While a contract may not be avoided in part, if not "devisable,"
the contract may be reformed on the ground of either mistake or misrepresentation. 74 New Mexico has recognized mutual mistake as a ground
for reformation in a number of cases.' 7 The court, however, found
several problems with reformation in this case. First, the mistake was
not a mistake as to the contents of the writing, but was instead a mistake
that the condemnation would be partial. 76 Further, no evidence was
found that, in the event of total condemnation, the parties intended a
result different than the one specified in the lease. 7 Second, it would
not help the lessee to reform the lease to express the agreement between
the parties that he described in his affidavit. As that agreement only
concerned rebuilding the lounge on remaining property, in the event of
partial condemnation, the agreement so reformed would not apply to the
actual situation which developed. 78 The lessee's contention that the reformation should take the form of deleting the condemnation clause would
have amounted to partial avoidance, which the court found was not
permitted. 7
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As another alternative argument, the lessee argued that the lessor's
statements that he would rebuild the lounge on any remaining property
were misrepresentations that should allow the lessee to avoid or reform
the lease. 80 The court rejected this argument, finding the misrepresentation, if it occurred, insufficient to allow the lessee to partially disaffirm
the lease for the same reasons the court found with regard to the lessee's
claim of mutual mistake.' 8' Similarly, reformation of the lease would not
help the lessee any more than would reformation based upon mutual
mistake.
The lessee's final assertion was that the condemnation clause was
unconscionable. ' 2 The court recognized the doctrine of unconscionability,
83 The court, however, found
both in general and as applied to leases.
that the lessee had presented no evidence that this clause, was in fact
unconscionable.' 84 The lessee admitted that there was ample authority
85 Based on this evidence,
upholding the validity of clauses of this type.
the Court found that it was proper for the court below to grant the
lessor's motion for summary judgment.
Garley has not substantially changed New Mexico's law regarding the
reformation or rescission of commercial leases. It was, however, the first
time that New Mexico specifically adopted the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts' definition of mutual mistake. Further, Garley clarifies New
Mexico's position on the use of mistake and misrepresentation as grounds
for rescission or reformation of commercial leases.
JONATHAN McCORMICK
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